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In 1960, the author, then Professor Hays and an experienced and
respected labor arbitrator, deplored1 the language used by the Supreme
Court in the celebrated steelworkers' trilogy.2 At that time, his criti-
cism was directed not at the system of labor arbitration, but only at
the Court's romanticism about the virtues of arbitrators, about the
uniqueness of the labor agreement, and about the parties' desire for
free-wheeling, rather than contractually oriented, adjudication. In this
volume, which contains the Storrs Lectures delivered at Yale Law
School in 1965, the author, now Judge Hays3 of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, after reiterating his earlier
criticism of the Court's approach, launches a sweeping attack on the
entire institution of labor arbitration. He finds its shortcomings to be
so serious that he urges, among other remedies, that "the courts should
not lend themselves at all to the arbitration process." 4 Thus, he now
takes issue with not only the language of the trilogy but also with their
results and with the long legal development that preceded them.5 His
subtitle, "A Dissenting View," is appropriate, for he would bury the
system that so many have praised as an instrument of industrial peace
and industrial justice.
His dissent in general treats labor arbitration as a genteel and lucra-
tive form of prostitution. Specifically, he makes the following charges,
1 See Hays, The Supreme Court and Labor Law October Term, 1959, 60 COLUm. L. RiEv.
901, 919-35, especially 923-25, 930-31 (1960).
2 United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel
& Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
3 Judge Hays' criticism of a process that will be involved in his judicial work contrasts
sharply with the self-limitation practiced by Justices Brandeis and Cardozo. Their
austerity has, however, not been emulated by some of the current members of the
Supreme Court and by other judges, who have increasingly taken to the lecterns to speak
about future issues and to defend past positions. See Kurland, Review of Douglas, The
Bible and the Schools, Chicago Tribune, January 30, 1966 (Books Today), p. 1. This is
not the place to appraise this tendency.
4 P. 113.
5 Indeed, Judge Hays would be even more restrictive than the common law; for, con-
trary to the common law, he would deny judicial enforcement of the award. See ELKouRu &
ELKouiu, How ARBITRATION WoRs 21 (rev. ed. 1960).
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most of which are familiar themes in the folklore about labor arbi-
tration:
(1) "A proportion of arbitration awards . . . are decided
not on the basis of the evidence or of the contract or
other proper considerations," but in a way designed to
preserve the arbitrator's employability.6 Regardless of the
proportion of such awards, which is unknown, a system
of adjudication in which the judge's income depends on
pleasing those who engage him is per se a thoroughly un-
desirable system, wholly incompatible with the indepen-
dence that a judicial officer should have.7
(2) Some awards, probably not a large number, are rigged.8
(3) There is probably a "fairly widespread use" of "compro-
mise awards," resulting from desire of arbitrators to
preserve their acceptability9 and from their failure to
recognize that rules as to the burden of persuasion are
indispensable for any adversary proceeding.' 0
(4) A large proportion of awards, "literally thousands of
cases every year," are rendered by arbitrators "who do not
have the requisite knowledge, training, skill, intelli-
gence, and character."-"
(5) Some arbitrators engage in ambulance chasing and fee-
padding,12 prolong hearings by failing to control them,
and delay decisions, 13 thereby frustrating the quick and
inexpensive adjudication that the system is supposed to
provide. 14
(6) Arbitrators, in order to make themselves acceptable to
unions,15 have introduced factors, such as the "common
law" of the plant, extraneous to a proper construction of
agreements and have thereby increased the power of
unions.
6 P. 112.
7 Ibid. The author's emphasis on economic considerations invites a word about my own
involvement with labor arbitration. I have served as an arbitrator in the past, and I am
a member of the National Academy of Arbitrators. Several years ago I requested, however,
the removal of my name from the lists of referring agencies, and, with rare and insigni-
ficant exceptions, I have also been declining appointments tendered directly by the
parties. My current inactivity as an arbitrator is not based on any conviction that arbitra-
tion is corrupt but is based solely on a desire to put my time elsewhere.
8 p. 113. But see p. 59, where the author assumes "that the use of these devices is fairly
widespread, although we cannot say how wide."
9 P. 59, 66.
10 P. 70.
11 P. 112.
12 Pp. 66-67.
13 Pp. 49, 67.
'4 Pp. 66-67.
15 Pp. 61-62.
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Before turning to the author's attempt to support his indictment, it
may be useful to refer generally to four important difficulties in his
presentation, which I propose to develop later:
(1) He ignores that the pressure for acceptability has impor-
tant values, as well as dangers, and that it operates to
weed out incompetent and corrupt arbitrators.
(2) He is silent about the shortcomings of alternative meth-
ods of adjudication that he prefers to arbitration.
(3) His brickbats, like the Court's bouquets, suffer from a
painful lack of documentation. Although he acknowl-
edges and deplores the lack of pertinent data and stud-
ies, 16 that consideration does not inhibit his cynical and
accusatory over-generalizations. Furthermore, in the few
instances where he reaches for documentation, his meth-
ods of investigation are of dubious validity.
(4) He suggests the importation of institutions developed
abroad without considering social differences that may
seriously limit the utility of such institutions in the
United States.
The first two difficulties are especially apparent in the author's
treatment of the problems arising from the arbitrator's dependence on
his acceptability to the parties who employ and pay him. Such de-
pendence may, of course, involve special risks. Thus, an arbitrator con-
cerned only with future business might prefer the party who has given
him more business or who controls more future business, or who other-
wise would be less likely to elect him.17 He might, moreover, use par-
ticular cases to balance his box score in a particular relationship or in
general. He might also render a compromise award in the hope of
avoiding serious displeasure to either one of his employers or the in-
terest group that they represent. Finally, he might give one party the
decision and attempt to placate the loser with language in his opinion.
The foregoing risks of distortion involve, as the author suggests, a de-
parture from the ideals of disinterested adjudication.
The arbitration system contains, however, countervailing safeguards
that the author neglects. In most arbitrations, one party must, of
course, lose, and it is the losing party that is the principal threat to the
arbitrator's future acceptability. The question for the arbitrator, as-
suming arguendo that he is ruled by greed, is how to reduce such
threats. The answer seems to be conscientious workmanship in con-
ducting the hearing and rendering the award; for such workmanship
would appear to be the best protection against the veto that labor and
le Pp. 38-S9.
'7 P. 61.
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management will each have in the future. The need for future accept-
ability may thus bring the arbitrator's self-interest and responsible ad-
judication into harmony rather than into conflict. That possibility is,
moreover, reinforced by the parties' frequent scrutiny of the back-
ground, record, and reputation of prospective arbitrators whom they do
not know.' Consequently, even if one accepted a devil's view of arbi-
trators, as a group ruled by the love of money, it would not follow that
the pressure for future acceptability would corrupt the decisional pro-
cess. On the contrary, the "invisible hand," even though it may be "all
thumbs" in other contexts, appears in this context to link the private
ends of arbitrators with the public interest in justice.
The devil's theory rests, moreover, on presuppositions about arbi-
trators as a class and their employers that are dubious indeed. It pre-
supposes that arbitrators lack a sense of responsibility, of craftsman-
ship, and of self-respect, and that they are essentially a craven group of
money-grubbers abjectly fearful of displeasing one of their customers
and willing to distort their awards and their opinions in order to avoid
such displeasure. I find no basis in this book or in my experience for
so denigrating a view of arbitrators as a class. Indeed, the arbitrators
whom I know impress me as conscientious men prepared to decide
cases as they see them. Differing judgments about the character of a
large and shifting class may, of course, result from different slices of
experience and different standards, and I would not claim that my ex-
perience is adequate for a general characterization. But the difficulties
of such general characterizations should serve as a caution against blan-
ket indictments as well as blanket encomia.
Judge Hays' view of the parties is no more flattering than his view
of arbitrators. He sees the parties as having their weapons of economic
reprisal ready for use against the arbitrator who rules against them
or otherwise displeases them. That view ignores, however, that the
parties are often conscious of the weakness of their case, that they are
often shaken, and sometimes persuaded, by the hearings or the opin-
ion, and that they understand the possibility of honest and reasonable
disagreement.
There are, moreover, bits and pieces of evidence that call into seri-
18 The author refers to organizations that make it a business to issue ratings of pros-
pective arbitrators as "pro" or "anti" union. P. 39. My own informal checking with a small
and a not necessarily representative sample of lawyers involved in labor arbitrations
suggests that the importance of such ratings and of box scores and blacklists has been
highly exaggerated. To be sure, those who select arbitrators prefer one who is likely to be
receptive to their positions. But the search for "friendly" neutrals is so elusive, in part
because of the need for joint acceptability, that the parties are, I have been assured,
willing to settle for an arbitrator who appears to be competent and fair-minded.
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ous question Judge Hays' dismal view of the parties. There are refresh-
ing instances where the loser has commended the arbitrator's opinion
and has called him for more work. There are also denials by attorneys
appearing in arbitrations that defeat is followed by indignation or
blacklisting. Finally, it is striking that lawyers for management or for
unions are respected arbitrators. Their reputation for integrity and
craftsmanship has overridden suspicions of partisanship generated by
their identification with one group of clients or by their ideological
commitments. It is, of course, possible that one canny forum-shopper
will rely on the partisan connections of an arbitrator to induce him
to lean over backwards while the other side will rely on his doing
what comes naturally. But, if the answers of lawyers I have questioned
can be relied on, the explanation for the acceptability of such arbi-
trators lies not in such gamesmanship, but in the parties' confidence
that men of integrity and competence can, as adjudicators, transcend
their personal loyalties and discipline their personal values.
I do not mean to be a Pollyanna about the parties or about arbi-
trators. The parties do engage in economic reprisals against an arbi-
trator who has displeased them, and fear of such displeasure may dis-
tort judgment in a particular case. But I do suggest that the incidence
of such reprisals is probably exaggerated and that, in any event, dis-
tortion for the purpose of avoiding such reprisal is checked by the
need to be acceptable to both parties and by the integrity of arbitra-
tors. Furthermore, the work of most arbitrators is distributed over
many relationships; consequently, reprisal by one party is not so fear-
some a prospect. Where, as in the case of some permanent umpires,
the arbitrator has many eggs in one basket, the continuing scrutiny
of both parties operates to check slipshod or biased adjudication.
The author fails, moreover, to consider the extent to which similar
pressures for acceptability impinge on official tribunals. I do not mean
to justify distortion, partisanship, or sloppiness in arbitration by
pointing to its existence elsewhere. But the author is engaged in com-
paring alternative tribunals in a real world; consequently, the methods
of staffing official tribunals that might replace arbitrators 9 deserve
attention. This is not the place for an extended discussion of the fac-
tors that enter into the selection of administrative and judicial per-
sonnel. It is enough to mention that considerations of politics and
patronage often place mediocrities on adjudicative tribunals and that
such appointees may seek to remain acceptable to those who have con-
19 The author suggests that labor courts should replace arbitration. See pp. 116-18 and
text accompanying note 60 infra.
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ferred past favors and who may determine future preferment. Indeed,
the fear that official tribunals are the targets of attempted manipu-
lation has contributed to the growth of labor arbitration. 20 The exis-
tence of such fears, whatever their basis in fact, is significant for two.
reasons: First, it underscores that arbitration may serve as an escape
hatch for those who doubt the fitness of official tribunals. Second, it
brings into question an appraisal of arbitration that, like the author's,
exaggerates the vices of arbitrators, then assumes that alternative mech-
anisms conform to an ideal model, and finally concludes that arbitration
is an evil process that should be supplanted by other tribunals.
I turn now to the count in the author's indictment that deals with
the "rigged award," that is, an award which is agreed to by the union
and the employer but which is palmed off as the arbitrator's inde-
pendent decision based on an adversary proceeding. Such awards may
result from employer bribery, unknown to the arbitrator, 21 but my
guess is that they more frequently result from the desire of the union
leadership to avoid the political consequences of meritorious settle-
ments. The success of the deception naturally requires that the parties
and the arbitrator keep silent about their masquerade. As a result, it
is extremely difficult to get any reliable data about the incidence of
such awards.
I wholly agree with the author's condemnation of the rigged award.
When such awards involve the interests of an individual grievant or
a group of grievants, the deception involved is wholly incompatible
with the union's duty of fair representation. Such deception is also
incompatible with the arbitrator's duty to protect the integrity of the
decisional process over which he presides. It perverts that process into
a device for insulating the parties from the political consequences of
their conduct. The use of such awards to get the union off the hook
is, in my view, wholly incompatible with the accountability implicit
in internal union democracy. Consequently, such awards are, in my
view, improper regardless of whether they dispose of an individual
grievance or fix the terms of a new agreement for the entire bargain-
ing unit and regardless of the substantive fairness of the ultimate
award. As Professor Fuller observed: "In practice, the temptation to
take short cuts in order to do good is a much greater threat to the
integity of arbitration than the temptation to use its forms for evil
purposes. '22
20 See Aaron, On First Looking into the Lincoln Mills Decision, NATIONAL AcADEMy OF
AmrnATons, 12m ANNUAL MEETING PROCEEDINGS 12 (1959).
21 Cf. pp. 62-63.
22 See Fuller, Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator, 1963 Wis. L. Rxv. 3, 22. Fuller
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Judge Hays is, however, not content to condemn the rigged award
as an excrescence of the arbitration system. He tells us that the prac-
tice, although probably not very frequent, is so "vicious that no system
including such a practice can have any proper claim to being a system
of justice. '23 So undiscriminating a reaction, if generalized, would
prevent any earthly form of adjudication from being called a system
of justice. Manifestly, courts also can become the instruments of rigged
determinations, for example, when a judge approves a settlement that
results from a lawyer's sell-out of his client's interests. 24 I would have
no reason to quarrel with the suggestion that some arbitrators are
unduly tolerant of the rigged award, but surely the remedy is to ex-
tirpate such apparently infrequent awards, rather than the arbitration
system. Judge Hays' overreaction calls to mind the caution that Mr.
Justice Frankfurter was so fond of: Don't throw out the baby with
the bath water.
Judge Hays' criticism of compromise awards fails, I believe, to dif-
ferentiate such awards from rigged awards with sufficient clarity. A
compromise award, unlike a rigged award, does not involve the arbi-
illustrates what he considers an innocent form of the rigged award by presenting the
following case: five or six closely related grievances have been heard over a three day period.
If the sixth case is to be heard, a new hearing will have to be scheduled, which will be
difficult. Although the arbitrator has not formally decided the sixth case, his approach has
become apparent, and the disposition of the sixth case is not hard to predict. The parties'
representatives ask the arbitrator to incorporate their agreed disposition into an award:
Fuller suggests: "if the first five cases were reported to the membership as settled by
arbitration while the sixth was reported to the membership as settled by agreement, quite
unjustified suspicions and doubts would be aroused." He concludes that it would take a
"purist" to see any real wickedness in the arbitrator's putting the agreed settlement "in
series" with its five companions. Id. at 21.
Nevertheless, Fuller's suggestion seems questionable for several reasons: (1) Approval
of feigned adversary proceedings in particular situations will breed all sorts of unmanage-
able distinctions; (2) The deception involved in Fuller's case could probably be avoided
without scheduling a hearing, e.g., by a stipulation that the sixth case be resolved on the
basis of the "principles" applied in the first five; (3) The individual most directly affected
by the disposition of a grievance is, I believe, entitled to disclosure of the basis on which
it was disposed. It is, moreover, unlikely that such disclosure would in the case supposed
arouse suspicions. In any event, an additional hearing designed to avoid both such sus-
picions and the deception of a rigged award would not be an "excessive" price to pay for
maintaining the integrity of the adversary process.
Shulman also appeared to condone agreed-upon adjustments that were presented as a
decision of the umpire "to avoid internal difficulties." See Shulman, Reason, Contract, and
Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARv. L. Rlv. 999, 1023 (1955).
23 P. 113.
24 Such settlements may, of course, be distinguished from rigged awards in that the
court, unlike the arbitrator, is unaware of the breach of fiduciary obligations. But judges
may also be corrupt or complacent. In this connection, New York counsel have suggested
informally that the New York practices surrounding approval of agreed-on settlements in
stockholders' derivative actions raise serious questions.
The University of Chicago Law Review
trator in a conspiracy of deception. Since compromise awards are more
visible, a study of published awards or survey techniques might have
yielded pertinent data about the incidence of such awards. In any
event, a compromise award is not necessarily wrong. Such awards, to
be sure, may flow from the arbitrator's irresolution or from his desire
to be loved by both parties-weaknesses that are, however, not pecu-
liar to the arbitration system. But such awards may also flow from dif-
ficulties presented by particular situations that do not fit neatly into
legal or contractual molds, or may, indeed, result from the parties'
intimations in open proceedings as to the terms of an acceptable dispo-
sition that falls short of the parties' maximum demands. Such inti-
mations are not peculiar to arbitration. Accordingly, labelling an
award "a compromise" tells us little about its intrinsic desirability.
Similarly, the existence of "compromises" in arbitration should not
lead to outright condemnation of that system any more than compro-
mises by judges or juries warrant wholesale condemnation of the legal
system.
Judge Hays is probably making a more modest point about compro-
mise awards, i.e., that the desire for acceptability produces a large
number of compromises prompted by the quest for business rather
than justice. That point at first glance has some plausibility. But,
according to a study relied on by the author for another point,25 com-
promise awards are distasteful to both sides and are likely to result in
future disqualification of the compromising arbitrator. 26 Consequently,
the need for acceptability may inhibit undesirable compromises more
in the arbitration process than in other forms of adjudication. In any
event, a priori surmises are of doubtful utility in determining the
incidence of undesirable or self-serving compromises.
The author's charge of widespread incompetence among arbitrators
is no more persuasive than his imputations of widespread venality.
He acknowledges that, apart from the 300 members of the National
Academy of Arbitrators, there are no figures, no statistics, no studies
about the background of arbitrators.27 For reasons that he does not
state, he passes over the membership of the Academy, despite the
availability of pertinent data. He turns instead to a publication by
the Bureau of National Affairs, which lists a larger number of arbi-
trators, consisting of those whose awards are published by the Bureau,
together with biographical sketches of some of the arbitrators involved
25 P. 59.
26 See Macdonald, The Selection and Tenure of Arbitrators, N.Y.U. Isr ANN. CONF. ON
L oR 145, 179 (1948).
27 P. 53.
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(i.e., 652 biographees out of 945 arbitrators). He pronounces the fol-
lowing judgment about the biographees:
[There are] only a dozen or so persons whose records reveal
any substantial distinction, but there are astonishingly few
whose past experience, other than legal training, includes
anything of importance that is relevant to arbitration.28
As the underscoring, which I have supplied, suggests, the author's
standards are somewhat elastic. More importantly, his treatment of
the biographical list appears to have been dominated by a spirit of
denigration. Thus, he indicates that the list he examined included
223 academics and 43 judges, past and present.29 The substantial range
of competence among judges and academics warrants skepticism that
either affiliation is necessarily a badge of ability. Nevertheless, the
conclusion that only a dozen or so from the total of over 600, includ-
ing the academics and judges, had records showing any substantial
distinction suggests that the author was applying extremely exacting
standards as he searched for men of distinction. I have tested that
possibility by looking at a small portion of the group involved. That
sub-group was limited, first, to names of lawyers and law professors
appearing in the first volume of the four volume directory, about
whose work and careers I had enough information for a responsible
judgment. I set forth below 19 lawyers and law professors 0 who are
listed in the first volume and whose records I would read as showing
some substantial distinction. Plainly, my own list of 19 would have
28 P. 54.
29 Ibid.
30 Aaron, Ben
Feinsinger, Walter Paul
Fisher, Walter T.
Forrester, William Ray
Frey, Alexander H.
Garrison, Lloyd K.
Gellhom, Walter
Hamilton, Walton H.
Hays, Paul R.
Maggs, Douglas
Matthews, Robert
Morgan, Edmund M.
O'Brian, John Lord
Poletti, Charles
Rosenman, Samuel F.
Schaefer, Walter V.
Shulman, Harry
Smith, Young B.
Wirtz, W. Willard.
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been considerably higher if it had been culled from all four volumes3'
and if its completion had not been subject to the drastic limitations
described above. I agree, however, with the author's conclusion that
the biographical directory affords no support for the theory urged by
the Supreme Court "that arbitrators in general have some special ex-
pertise in the labor relations area that gives them an advantage over
even the 'ablest judges.' "32 But neither the author's biographical exer-
cise nor any other data presented by him support the charge that
"thousands of cases" every year are decided by incompetents.
The author's conclusions again outdistance his data when he deals
with the experience of arbitrators. Thus, he tells us that the biographi-
cal data and the published awards suggest that "in scores of instances
arbitrators' experience has been confined to a single case, and in hun-
dreds of others is limited to very few cases over a considerable period
of time and involving different enterprises. '33 Earlier he had relied
on an estimate that only four per cent of the total number of awards
rendered are published.34 That estimate suggests that the biographical
data and the awards listed in the BNA are a hopelessly inadequate
basis for judging the experience of arbitrators. That difficulty is, more-
over, compounded by the existence of multiple publication services.
The data about the author himself demonstrates the weakness of his
method. He tells us that he has decided "hundreds of cases," 35 but an
examination of the BNA index covering volumes 1-40 and the period
from 1949 to 1964 shows that only twelve of his awards were reported
there.
The author again gives free rein to his penchant for denunciation
in his discussion of fees. He relies on secondary materials to support
his charge of fee-padding but sometimes ignores that those materials
criticized only a minority of arbitrators.36 He gives us one undocu-
mented statistic about per diem charges, telling us that some arbi-
trators charge as high as $500 per day.37 Charges that high seem to be
so rare that that figure is a misleading truth. Thus, a study based on
a sampling of cases in the files of the Federal Mediation and Concili-
31 The same name may appear in more than one volume of that directory. Hence, it
would be erroneous to multiply the sum derived from any one volume by four.
32 P. 58.
33 Pp. 58-59.
34 P. 53.
35 P. 42.
36 See Raeffle, Needed: A Fourth Party in Industrial Relations, 13 LAB. L.J. 230, 238
(1962), cited on p. 52; cf. p. 60; see also Aaron, Labor Arbitration and its Critics, 10 LAB.
L.J. 605, 610 (1959), cited on p. 52.
37 P. 67.
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ation Service indicates that in 1962-63 the average per diem charge
for discharge cases was $129, 38 that the mode of per diem charges was
$125, and that the number of cases involving charges of $200, the
highest charge shown, was quite small.3 9 And a survey by the National
Academy of Arbitrators, which purports to be an elite group, showed
that the average daily rate charged by its members for grievance cases
in 1964 was $142, up fom $126 in 1962.40 Those figures were available
to the author. His disregard of them, coupled with his exclusive reli-
ance on high-priced sports in his discussion of fees, is scarcely calcu-
lated to inspire confidence in his methodology or judiciousness.
The final count in the indictment involves "the approach to arbi-
tration in terms of the necessity of considering 'the common law of
the shop,' the 'gaps' in the collective agreement, 'past practice,' 'in-
creased productivity,' and the 'lessening of tensions.'"41 The author
appears to ratify the suggestion that "these concepts were introduced
for the purpose of permitting the arbitrator to decide more grievances
for the union and thus to keep his job."42 Neither the author nor his
source explains how a would-be arbitrator promotes his acceptability
to employers by adopting an approach designed to aid unions as a class.
That suggestion again seems to ignore that the pressures generated by
acceptability are opposing or countervailing rather than one-direc-
tional.
The author's judgment about the consequences of the "approaches"
described above seems more persuasive than his imputation of motives.
Arbitration is essentially a vehicle by which unions protest action ini-
tiated by management on the ground that it is contrary to the contract.
To the extent that restrictions embodied in contract terms are ex-
tended by reference to the "common law" of the shop, the number of
successful union protests will increase. But that generality tells us noth-
ing about the soundness of an approach that goes beyond the words
of a written agreement. Surely, nothing is more familiar in the general
law of contracts than consideration of background, practice, function,
and consequences. 43 It is strange for Judge Hays, who so persuasively
38 See Fleming, The Labor Arbitration Process, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS
17TH ANNUAL MEETING PROCEEDINGS 33, 42 (1964).
39 Id. at 44. These figures may have to be qualified because the Federal Mediation
Service imposed a ceiling of $150 on January 18, 1957. 29 C.F.R. § 1404.12 (1965).
40 See Survey of Arbitration in 1964, NATIONAL AcADEArY OF ARBITRATORS 18TH ANNUAL
MEETING PROCEmEINGS 243, 246 (1965).
41 P. 61.
42 Ibid.
43 See Meltzer, The Supreme Court, Arbitrability and Collective Bargaining, 28 U. Cm.
L. REv. 464, 480-81 (1960).
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admonishes arbitrators to take account of the general law of contracts, 44
to complain because they have applied concepts made familiar by that
law. Indeed, Professor Fuller has argued that if a general comparison
is to be made about the relative strictness or looseness of contract
construction, the generalization should be that arbitrators are more
strict and literal than the courts. 45 Finally, Professor Cox, whose work
the author praises as demonstrating the qualities of the ideal arbitra-
tor,46 has in his academic writings emphasized the importance of giv-
ing effect to the common law of the plant, past practice, and the other
concepts47 that the author apparently views as having been used so as
to increase unwarrantedly the power of unions.
In his concluding lecture, portentously titled "The Future of Labor
Arbitration," the author turns from citicism to reform and suggests
three remedies for the shortcomings of labor arbitration:
(1) The courts, if they are to enforce the duty to arbitrate
and arbitral awards, should carefully scrutinize, instead
of rubber stamping, awards.4
8
(2) But the remedy preferred by the author, is, as already
indicated, the withholding of any judicial assistance to
the arbitration process. 49
(3) Finally, as a concession to those who, unlike the author,
believe that "special expertise" is desirable for those who
adjudicate asserted violations of collective agreements,
he suggests the establishment of labor courts, based on
European experience and employing simplified proce-
dures such as those used by small claims courts in this
country.50
The proposal for greater judicial supervision of the award, as I
have urged elsewhere,51 is appealing. Arbitration, like other modes of
44 See pp. 44-47.
45 Fuller, supra note 22, at 7-8. See, e.g., Zdanok v. Glidden Company, 327 F.2d 944,
953 (2d Cir. 1964), where the court, although invoking the "law of the case" as grounds for
not disturbing its previous decision, questioned the free wheeling approach on which it
had rested. It is also of interest here that arbitrators, in the interval between the first two
rounds of the Glidden case, rejected the free construction adopted by the court in round
I. See, e.g., United Packinghouse Workers of America, Local No. 277, 38 LABOR ARBITRATON
RroRlrs 619 (award dated May 18, 1962, by Peter M. Kelliher, Esq., Chicago).
46 P. 52.
47 See Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration, 72 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1493-1500
(1959). See also Wellington, Judicial Review of the Promise to Arbitrate, 37 N.Y.U.L. Rv.
471, 475 (1962).
48 Pp. 79-80.
49 P. 113.
50 Pp. 116-17.
r1 See Meltzer, supra note 43, at 485.
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adjudication, involves sufficient danger of error and abuse to justify
the deterrent and curative influence typically provided by judicial
review.52 A broader reviewing power exercised, as the author suggests,
after rendition of the award, 3 would, moreover, give the reviewing
tribunal the benefit of any special insights possessed by the arbitrator.
An enlarged judicial role, even though coupled with such a concept
of primary jurisdiction, would, of course, involve the risk of excessive
judicial interference. But that risk would be essentially similar to
that involved in judicial review of administrative determinations. It
is true that the parties by modifying their agreements could expand
the judicial role with respect to arbitration. But the Court's endorse-
ment of arbitral autonomy adds to the other complications surround-
ing such attempted modification.54 In any event, there are well-founded
doubts about a system that requires courts to exercise their equitable
powers both to compel arbitration and t6 enforce compliance with
arbitral awards, and at the same time denies courts the power to deter-
mine whether there is a rational basis in the parties' agreement for
the awards that are to be enforced. The suggestion supported by the
author would, in my opinion, impose a desirable limitation on such
an extraordinary conscription of judicial power.85
The alternative proposal preferred by the author, i.e., judicial ab-
stention, appears at first blush to be inconsistent with his plea that
judicial enforcement should be accompanied by more extensive judi-
cial supervision. Plainly, if the potential for arbitral abuse is so great
that the courts should do more, if anything, it seems strange to urge
that courts should do nothing at all in relation to arbitration.56 That
52 The author, p. 101, points to Grace Line v. National Marine Engineers Beneficial
Assn., 38 Misc. 2d 909, 239 N.Y.S.2d 293 (Sup. Ct. 1963), aff'd mem., 20 App. Div. 2d 759,
246 N.Y.S.2d 994 (1st Dep't), leave to appeal denied, 14 N.Y.2d 484, 200 N.E.2d 220, 250
N.Y.S.2d 1026, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 843 (1964), as a case in which an unjustified award
was not disturbed because of limitations imposed on judicial review. I agree with that
assessment; it is, however, of interest that a decision by a trial court in a similar case was
left undisturbed by the supreme court of New Jersey. See Adams v. Jersey Central Power
& Light Company, 21 N.J. 8, 120 A.2d 737 (1956); HANDLER & HAYS, CASES ON LABOR LAW
408 (3d ed. 1959).
53 For a case that appears to involve a more expansive review of the award, see Tor-
rington Co. v. Local 1645, Metal Products Workers, 62 L.R.R.M. 2495 (2d Cir. June 22,
1966) (one judge dissenting).
54 See Meltzer, supra note 43, at 486-87.
55 Id. at 484-86. It should be noted, however, that judicial scrutiny only after an award
has been rendered may be of limited usefulness where strikes or employee unrest is
touched off or threatened by an employer's failure to abide by an award. Nevertheless, the
prospect of such scrutiny may encourage more careful workmanship by arbitrators and
thereby reduce the occasions in which judicial review is invoked.
56 As the author acknowledges, p. 114, his objection to judicial intervention is based
on considerations quite different from those that moved Shulman, among others, to decry
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apparent inconsistency can, however, be avoided on the basis of two
separate, if overlapping, grounds: (1) the author's suggestion that arbi-
tration departs so fundamentally from a system of justice that it should
not be legitimated by judicial support; (2) the premise that even
enlarged judicial review could not effectively curb arbitral abuses;
hence, courts should not attempt to regulate a system whose results
are beyond effective judicial control. I have not found the author's
development of either ground convincing. Furthermore, the author
does not adequately explore the implications of his suggestion for a
wholly voluntary system. To be sure, he favors legal enforcement of
other provisions of the agreement,57 including, presumably, no-strike
clauses. But he ignores the truth in the conventional insight that arbi-
tration is a substitute, not for a law suit, but for a strike. Even though
that insight, as Shulman urged, is incomplete, 5s the connection be-
tween arbitration and no-strike clauses raises the question whether
withdrawal of legal support for arbitration would weaken the moral
force of the no-strike clause and, indeed, of the whole agreement, or
would at least give rise to justifiable charges of one-sidedness like those
prompted by Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson.59
The author does little more than mention his final proposal, that
a system of labor courts with jurisdiction over grievances be estab-
lished.60 That proposal is inspired by labor courts abroad, which deal
with issues resolved in this country by arbitrators and courts of general
jurisdiction. The foreign models differ in their docket and in the social
context in which they operate. That diversity, together with the au-
thor's sketchiness, makes it difficult to react to his proposal. This re-
viewer disclaims, moreover, adequate knowledge of foreign models.
Nevertheless, there are several obvious points that sharpen the familiar
question as to whether good foreign institutions, like good foreign
wines, would export well: The coverage and the detail of American
bargaining agreements have been considerably greater than that of
foreign agreements. 61 Such coverage, together with our greater size
and litigiousness, is likely to produce a much larger and diversified
such intervention. See Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARv.
L. REV. 999, 1024 (1955). But cf. Feller's comments in Arbitration and the Law, NATIONAL
ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 12TH ANNUAL MEETING PROCEEINGS 14, 16-17 (1959).
57 P. 116.
58 See Shulman, supra note 56, at 1024.
59 370 U.S. 195 (1962), holding that the Norris-La Guardia Act bars specific performance
of no-strike clauses. Although employers may also seek to compel arbitration, unions
generally have been the moving parties.
60 P. 117.
61 McPherson, Basic Issues in German Labor Court Structure, 5 LAB. L.J. 489, 441 (1954).
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docket than has confronted foreign systems. Consequently, the demands
on the personnel of such courts in the United States are likely to be
exacting. Furthermore, such tribunals would scarcely contribute to
industrial peace or justice if they became bogged down in the delays
that have characterized the administration of specialized tribunals such
as the National Labor Relations Board. Beyond those issues, there is
even a more critical one: Whether labor courts, as they are likely to be
staffed in this country, would deserve and command the confidence of
both parties. In this connection, it is useful to remember that arbitra-
tion was in part a response to the fear that official tribunals would
be manipulated. The crises of confidence that from time to time have
shaken the specialized tribunals, such as the NLRB, are not a happy
augury for the future and should qualify the enthusiasm that typically
accompanies proposals for new directions. An additional basis for cau-
tion is that labor and management abroad have preferred to establish
their own arbitration mechanisms in lieu of using labor courts.62 In
any event, arbitration is so deeply embedded in American labor rela-
tions that it seems unlikely that it would be abandoned in favor of a
labor court. Hence, the establishment of such a court might be a futile
exercise. It might, moreover, be affirmatively mischievous by encour-
aging tactical maneuvering in bargaining negotiations about the forum
for resolving grievances. In any event, a great deal more thought than
the author apparently gave, or even purported to give, to the problems
raised by a labor court is necessary for a judgment about its potential
utility in the United States.
Judge Hays' lectures, despite their shortcomings, are likely to pro-
vide a corrective against the mystique of expertise and the uncritical
praise that has been lavished on arbitration. But the Judge, while
debunking a mythology of arbitral excellence, has produced a new
mythology of incompetence and corruption. Unfortunately, his "ex-
tremism" may make it too easy to dismiss the sobering questions that
he has raised, or, what is less likely, may reduce the value of a social
tool that has made a substantial contribution to labor relations even
though it has the imperfections of all earthly institutions.
BERNARD D. MELTZER*
62 See SCHMIDT, THE LAw OF LABOUR RELATIONS IN SWEDFN 45 (1962).
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